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INEFFECTIVE BY DESIGN: A CRITIQUE OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES, AUSTRALIA, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
Kelly Ann Skahan†
Abstract: Though ostensibly tasked with enforcing their respective nations’
campaign finance laws, the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”), Australian Electoral
Commission (“AEC”), and Electoral Commission (“EC”) are woefully unable to
meaningfully address the evolving nature of campaigns or enforce existing regulations in
the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, respectively. Attempts at
enforcement are cut off at the knees by political infighting, half-hearted grants of
independent authority, and a lack of institutional support. Conversely, the New York
City Campaign Finance Board (“CFB”) is recognized as an example of meaningful
enforcement and relative political independence. By implementing changes that translate
the CFB’s municipally-successful structure to federal agencies, the FEC, AEC and EC
could become more effective in the enforcement of existing laws and better at adapting to
the changing face of elections.
Cite as: Kelly Ann Skahan, Ineffective By Design: A Critique of Campaign Finance Law
Enforcement in the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, 27 WASH. INT'L
L.J. 577 (2018).

I.

INTRODUCTION

In modern democracies, it takes money to run an election campaign
and laws to make sure a campaign is run fairly. Those laws are tested often.
Imagine: in one country, a government body receives five separate reports,
each alleging that political action committees have created shell companies
from which wealthy donors can contribute unlimited funds to their chosen
candidates—an illegal act.1 Across the Atlantic, the political party in power
egregiously oversteps long-established candidate spending limits in over two
dozen constituencies en route to a decisive electoral victory. 2 A hemisphere
away, a Senator transfers funds from his labor union’s accounts to his own
†

Kelly Ann Skahan is a J.D. Candidate at the University of Washington and is expected to graduate
in June 2018. The author received a B.A. in English from Villanova University. She would like to thank
Professor Lisa Marshall Manheim for her guidance and patience, the staff of the Washington International
Law Journal for their hard work, Vince Skahan for the history lessons, and Susan Skahan for everything.
1
OFFICE OF COMM’R ANN M. RAVEL, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, DYSFUNCTION AND DEADLOCK:
THE ENFORCEMENT CRISIS AT THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION REVEALS THE
UNLIKELIHOOD OF DRAINING THE SWAMP 14 (2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3474279
/Ravelreport-feb2017.pdf.
2
Martin Belam, What is the Tory election expenses story and why isn’t it bigger news?, GUARDIAN
(May 13, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/13/tory-election-expenses.
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campaign war chest, disclosing the donation fourteen months after he is
reelected—a full eight months after the law required him to do so.3 The
violations are not related, the beneficiaries are of different political
ideologies, and they are located thousands of miles apart. The common
thread in each corner of the globe: the bodies tasked with stopping
violations of campaign finance law do nothing in response.
Though similar in governmental structure and lawmaking procedure, 4
the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom each approach
campaign finance laws differently. Disclosure thresholds, 5 contribution
limits,6 foreign contributions,7 and the role of public financing8 vary widely
among the three countries. However, they share a common theme: all three
countries’ campaign finance laws are ineffective because they fail to
empower their respective campaign finance boards to meaningfully enforce
those laws. Specifically, political infighting paralyzes the United States’
Federal Election Commission (“FEC”), the Australian Electoral Commission
(“AEC”) fails to effectively monitor violations of campaign finance law, and
the insufficiently harsh penalties of the Electoral Commission (“EC”) fail to
deter the United Kingdom’s political parties from overstepping spending
limits.
Part I of this Comment examines the establishment, authority, and
structure of the campaign finance law enforcement bodies of the United
States, Australia, and the United Kingdom—the FEC, the AEC, and the EC,
3
Daniel Hurst, Bill Shorten quizzed over late disclosure of $75,000 in campaign support,
GUARDIAN (July 8, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/jul/08/bill-shorten-2007donation-declaration-updated-within-last-144-hours.
4
John Kilcullen, A comparison of Australian, British, Canadian and US political systems,
MACQUARIE U. DEP’T OF MOD. HIST. POL. & INT’L REL., http://www.mq.edu.au/about_us/faculties_and_
departments/faculty_of_arts/mhpir/staff/staff-politics_and_international_relations/john_kilcullen/
a_comparison_of_australian_british_canadian_and_us_political_systems/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2017).
5
Andrew Gibbons, Show us the money: It’s time to fix Australia’s broken campaign financing
system,
MELB.
SCH.
OF
GOV’T:
ELECTION
WATCH
–
AUSTL.
2016,
http://electionwatch.unimelb.edu.au/australia-2016/articles/show-us-the-money (last visited July 15, 2017).
6
Nick Thompson, International campaign finance: How do countries compare?, CNN (Mar. 5,
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/24/world/global-campaign-finance/index.html (“[T]he absence of
limits on the amount individuals or corporations can donate has contributed to the ongoing erosion of
public confidence in the political process in the UK, according to one watchdog organization.”).
7
Damien Cave & Jacqueline Williams, Australian Politics Is Open to Foreign Cash, and China
Has
Much
to
Gain,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
6,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/world/australia/china-political-influence-campaignfinance.html?_r=0.
8
See
generally
Public
funding
for
parties,
THE
ELECTORAL
COMM’N,
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/political-parties-campaigning-anddonations/public-funding-for-parties (last visited July 15, 2017).
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respectively. It also discusses instances in which each body failed to enforce
clear violations of campaign finance law in their respective jurisdictions.
Part II examines the establishment, authority, and structure of the New York
City Campaign Finance Board (“CFB”), known widely as one of the most
effective campaign finance law enforcement bodies in operation today,9 as
well as an example of effective enforcement on the part of the CFB. Part III
evaluates the FEC, AEC, and EC using five factors that make for effective
enforcement, based on the New York City CFB’s structure. Part IV and
finally, this Comment addresses the limits and challenges of applying
measures that succeed on the municipal level to a national enforcement
body.
II.

THE FEC, AEC, AND EC

The United States’ Federal Election Commission, the Australian
Electoral Commission, and the United Kingdom’s Electoral Commission are
each structured differently, with varying jurisdictions and responsibilities.
However, each body is ineffective because none can effectively enforce the
laws they ostensibly exist to maintain, develop, and impose. Specifically,
the FEC is crippled by deadlocked votes and consequent inaction, the AEC
fails to effectively monitor and audit campaign finance violations in the first
place, and the EC lacks authority to impose substantial penalties even when
significant violations occur.
A.

The United States’ Federal Election Commission

The United States’ history of campaign finance regulation began in
1907. President Roosevelt’s push for campaign finance reform led Congress
to enact the Tillman Act, which banned corporate contributions to political
candidates.10 Regulation continued through the first half of the twentieth
century with the adoption of the Federal Corrupt Practice Act and its
amendments, the Hatch Act, the Smith-Connally Act, and the Taft-Hartley
Act, each seeking to rein in corporate and union contributions to election
campaigns.11
9

Jack Noland, How to Effectively Enforce Campaign Finance Laws, ISSUE ONE (Dec. 4, 2015),
https://www.issueone.org/how-to-effectively-enforce-campaign-finance-laws/ (“One reason why [New
York City’s campaign finance system] has been so successful is because it is backed by an effective
enforcement agency.”).
10
Appendix 4: Federal Election Campaign Laws: A Short History, FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
https://transition.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2017).
11
Id.
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In 1971, the United States Congress passed the Federal Election
Campaign Act (“FECA”), “instituting more stringent disclosure
requirements for federal candidates, political parties, and political action
committees.”12 Three years later, in response to the Watergate scandal and
the 1972 presidential election, Congress passed amendments to the law that
set limits on contributions by individuals, political parties, and political
action committees.
The amendments consolidated previously-passed
campaign finance restrictions and formed a comprehensive system of
regulation, enforcement, and reporting requirements for federal elections.13
The amendments also established the FEC as an independent agency
designed to regulate campaign finance, collect disclosed finance
information, enforce civil penalties, and oversee public funding of
presidential elections.14
The FEC consists of six commissioners, no more than three of whom
can represent the same political party.15 Generally, commissioners “serve in
staggered six-year terms,”16 with two seats up for appointment every two
years and the chair of the Commission seat changing annually. 17 When no
successor is appointed, a commissioner may serve beyond her six-year term;
though each commissioner theoretically serves as chair only once,
commissioners who serve beyond their six-year term may become chair
more than one time.18
Recently, those appointments have been waylaid by political
infighting during the approval process. In 2008, for instance, only two
commissioners remained on the job when Senator Mitch McConnell
“demanded that the Senate vote on pending nominees as a package, not
individually,” leaving all but two seats open on the Commission. 19 Four
commissioners must agree for any official Commission action to occur; 20
12
Mission and History, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/about/mission-and-history/
(last visited July 15, 2017).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Leadership and Structure, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/about/leadership-andstructure/ (last visited July 15, 2017).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
See, e.g., Ellen L. Weintraub, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/about/leadership-andstructure/ellen-l-weintraub/ (last visited July 16, 2017).
19
Dave Levinthal, Another Massive Problem With U.S. Democracy: The FEC Is Broken, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 17, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/12/another-massive-problem-with-usdemocracy-the-fec-is-broken/282404/.
20
Leadership and Structure, supra note 15.
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consequently, if the Commission has open seats, it is difficult to obtain
approval of any proposed official action.21 In 2008, four open seats all but
paralyzed the Commission entirely.22
Open seats and a lack of consensus led to a steep rise in deadlocked
votes and a corresponding drop in official action by the Commission. In
2007, only seven percent of votes “failed to reach the four-vote threshold”
necessary for approval.23 After Republican Don McGahn’s appointment to
the Commission in 2008, that number climbed to thirty-two percent; by 2013
it had reached forty-one percent. 24 Consequently, fines imposed for
campaign finance violations dropped. The FEC assessed more than $6.7
million in fines in 2006, but in 2012 that number dropped to less than $1
million.25 In addition, the processing of cases slowed. While the FEC aims
to process cases within fifteen months of receiving them, it only managed to
do so seventy percent of the time. Alternative dispute resolutions also took
longer to assign, and though the Commission “aimed to conclude all nonpresidential audits [of campaigns] in an average of 10 months after the
election . . . it hit that benchmark just 27 percent of the time.”26
The FEC’s power to enforce law is also statutorily limited. 27 “The
FEC has exclusive jurisdiction over the civil enforcement of federal
campaign finance law”; 28 criminal prosecution, however, is the
responsibility of the Department of Justice.29 The Commission also has the
power to interpret the FECA through regulations and advisory opinions,30
21
Some argue that this gridlock was by design. “‘Congress created the agency to be structurally
deadlocked,’ said Ralph Nader . . . ‘Congress is content to defer to the FEC’s paralysis. It never wanted
an agency that would pinch both parties.’” Levinthal, supra note 19; see also Eric Lichtblau, F.E.C. Can’t
Curb 2016 Election Abuse, Commission Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/us/politics/fec-cant-curb-2016-election-abuse-commission-chiefsays.html (“‘Congress set this place up to gridlock,’ Lee E. Goodman, a Republican commissioner, said in
an interview. ‘This agency is functioning as Congress intended.’”).
22
Levinthal, supra note 19.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
52 U.S.C. § 30105 (2014).
28
Enforcing federal campaign finance law, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/legalresources/enforcement/ (last visited July 16, 2017).
29
CRAIG C. DONSANTO & NANCY L. SIMMONS, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES 198
(7th ed. 2007) (ebook), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2013/09/30/electbook0507.pdf.
30
2 U.S.C. § 437(c)(b)(1); 2 U.S.C. § 437(d)(a)(7); 2 U.S.C. § 437(d)(a)(8); 2 U.S.C. § 437(d)(3); 2
U.S.C. § 437(f); see generally Rebecca Curry, Making Law with Lawsuits: Understanding Judicial Review
in Campaign Finance Policy, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 389 (2013).
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though a majority of commissioners must agree before the FEC may issue
any regulation or opinion.
The agency’s civil enforcement cases come from four sources: audits
of political action committees’ reports, complaints, referrals from other
government agencies, and self-submissions from individuals or entities who
believe they have committed a violation.31 Enforcement cases are known as
matters under review (“MURs”). Less complicated matters may be referred
to either an alternative dispute resolution program or the Commission’s
Administrative Fines Program, which calculates pre-established fines for
routine violations like late or missing disclosure documents.32
Enforcement cases are usually triggered by a complaint or internal
referral. The Commission’s Office of General Counsel then reviews the
submitted materials and recommends a response to the Commission. 33 If
four commissioners agree there is reason to believe a violation occurred or is
about to occur, the Commission can open an investigation, open settlement
negotiations, or file a lawsuit if no alternative resolution is possible.34
The FEC’s susceptibility to deadlocks and stagnation is particularly
evident in recent United States Supreme Court decisions. Although the
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of disclosure, particularly with
regard to corporate contributions, in its 2010 decision in Citizens United,35
the FEC has yet to respond by issuing disclosure rules that take corporate
contributions into account. 36 Rather, the Commission has delayed
consideration, abstained, or voted against the Office of General Counsel’s
recommendation to investigate donations that were either improperly
disclosed or undisclosed entirely. Commissioner Ann Ravel detailed those
MURs in the report she issued upon her departure.37 She remarked that she,
along with Commissioners Weintraub and Walther, made over ten motions to
31

Enforcing federal campaign finance law, supra note 28.
RAVEL, supra note 1, at 6.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (“A campaign finance system
that pairs corporate independent expenditures with effective disclosure has not existed before today. It
must be noted, furthermore, that many of Congress’ findings in passing BCRA were premised on a system
without adequate disclosure . . . . With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can
provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials
accountable for their positions and supporters.”).
36
RAVEL, supra note 1, at 13.
37
Id. at 14.
32
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begin proceedings on allegations of improper disclosures after the Office of
General Counsel recommended opening an investigation, but no member of
the Republican bloc was willing to join them. Deadlocked, the Commission
ultimately did nothing to address the complaints.38
B.

The Australian Electoral Commission

Established in 1984, 39 the AEC is officially a three-person body; it
includes a chairperson, an electoral commissioner, and a non-judicial
member. 40 However, the three members are not identically powerful or
credentialed, and they do not vote on issues in the same way as their
counterparts in the United States. The chairperson must be a judge or retired
judge of the Australian Federal Court. 41 The electoral commissioner is
considered the chief executive officer of the Commission,42 and only his or
her position is full-time; the chairperson and non-judicial member hold their
offices on a part-time basis. 43 All three are appointed by Australia’s
governor-general.44 The commissioners hold office for up to seven years
and are eligible for reappointment.45 A quorum requires two members of the
Commission.46
Structurally, the AEC is quite different from the FEC. Rather than a
single centralized office and commission, the AEC has a three-tiered
structure; the agency is comprised of a national office in Canberra, state and
territory offices in each state’s capital, and 150 divisional offices throughout
the country tasked with managing the Commission’s diverse portfolio of
responsibilities.47 Electoral officers for the states are appointed directly by
the three commissioners, 48 and staff may be hired by the Commission as
needed.49

38

Id.
AEC organisational structure, AUSTL. ELECTORAL COMM’N (Dec. 8, 2017),
http://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/structure.htm.
40
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 sub-div 6(2) (Engl.).
41
Id. at sub-div 6(4).
42
Id. at sub-div 18(2).
43
Id. at sub-div 6(3).
44
Id. at sub-divs 6(3)–(4).
45
Id. at sub-div 8(1).
46
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 sub-div 15(3) (Austl.).
47
AEC organisational structure, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
48
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 sub-div 31(1) (Austl.).
49
Id. at sub-divs 35(1)–(2).
39
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The AEC’s jurisdiction is also different from that of its American
equivalent in several ways. Though both are independent agencies, the AEC
is primarily responsible for actually executing elections, including
establishing seat boundaries, redistributing districts, and maintaining voter
rolls.50 Statutorily, the AEC is responsible for considering and reporting to
the prime minister on electoral matters, promoting public awareness of
electoral matters, providing information and advice on electoral matters to
the government, conducting research on electoral matters, publishing on
matters related to elections, and providing assistance in matters relating to
foreign elections.51
Though the AEC’s jurisdiction does include campaign finance, the
Commission’s actual involvement with enforcement is limited;
consequently, violations of campaign finance law often go unnoticed. When
campaigns violate disclosure limits or accept illegal loans, the electoral
commissioner may bring an action in court against the candidate or an agent
of the party in violation.52 The AEC may also authorize investigation into
potential violations, requiring a candidate or party agent to produce
documents or appear for questioning.53 If the AEC finds a campaign has
violated the law, the Commission may refer the case to the relevant state or
territory office of the Commonwealth Directorate of Public Prosecutions
(“DPP”). It is within the DPP’s discretion whether to pursue the matter
further. 54 However, although the AEC is statutorily empowered to
investigate violations, the Commission’s jurisdiction is so broad that it often
fails to notice when a party files late disclosure statements or fails to file
them entirely.55
The AEC is more reticent about regulating campaigns and campaign
finance activity than the FEC. The agency’s 2016–2020 corporate plan
includes language stating “[a]s a regulatory body, the AEC aims to reduce
50
Functions
of
the
AEC,
AUSTL.
ELECTORAL
COMM’N
(Sept.
22,
2017),
http://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/AEC_Services/.
51
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 sub-divs 7(1)–(3) (Austl.).
52
Id. at sub-divs 315A(1)–(3).
53
Id. at sub-div 316(2A).
54
Bob Burton, What happens if a major political donor doesn’t disclose?, TASMANIAN TIMES (Oct.
30, 2015), http://www.tasmaniantimes.com/index.php/article/what-happens-if-a-major-political-donordoesnt-disclose.
55
Id. Additionally, online advertising generally falls into a gap between laws, where no Australian
enforcement body is tasked with monitoring campaign finance or electioneering violations that take place
on the internet. See Sarah Collerton, Pollies slip through web ad loophole, ABC (Aug. 18, 2010),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-08-19/pollies-slip-through-web-ad-loophole/950402.
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the regulatory burden imposed on electors through enrollment and voting
activities,”56 before laying out a framework for assessing the performance of
regulators. Satisfactory performance by a regulator, the AEC explains,
includes refraining from unnecessarily impeding efficient operation of
regulated entities, using clear communication, proportionately responding to
regulatory risk, dealing transparently, and streamlining monitoring
programs 57 —essentially, getting out of the way of campaigns rather than
actually regulating them.
Public trust in the AEC faltered after Australia’s 2013 federal election,
when the Commission referred over 8000 instances of multiple votes by the
same voter to the Australian Federal Police,58 implying that the AEC had
managed the election ineffectively. In response, the AEC instituted its
2016–2020 corporate plan, which identified five key “areas for
improvement”: a changed model for electoral events, improved quality and
assurance, professionalization of the AEC’s workforce, re-establishment of
the agency’s reputation, and more agility and responsiveness across the
agency.59
The AEC, however, falls victim to many of the same pitfalls as its
American equivalent. Australia’s Commission faces much of the same
partisan gridlock that cripples the United States’ enforcement body. Major
political parties in Australia are unwilling to rework campaign finance laws,
which are inconsistent from state to state and often conflict with the general
federal regime.60 Although federal law sets a donation disclosure limit of
$13000, states have set inconsistent disclosure limits beneath this ceiling.61
Further, disclosed donations are published six months after an election
concludes, limiting the usefulness of disclosure.62

56
AUSTL. ELECTORAL COMM’N, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION CORPORATE PLAN 15
(2016), http://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/Publications/corporate-plan/files/aec-corporate-plan-201620.pdf [hereinafter AEC CORPORATE PLAN].
57
Id.
58
Matthew Knott, AFP to investigate thousands of cases of multiple voting in 2013 election,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (May 30, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/afp-toinvestigate-thousands-of-cases-of-multiple-voting-in-2013-election-20140529-397wp.html.
59
AEC CORPORATE PLAN, supra note 56, at 5.
60
Anne Davies, Australia’s flawed political donations laws, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (July 27,
2015), http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/australias-flawed-political-donations-laws20150724-gijlll.html.
61
Id.
62
Id.
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Ultimately, the AEC is tasked with too wide a jurisdiction and is
encumbered by too few enforcement powers for it to effectively penalize
even widely-known violations. When legislative commission hearings
reveal campaign finance violations, the AEC fails to act. 63 In 2017,
Australian Labour Party leader Bill Shorten was scrutinized for
overpayments made by his labor union to his campaign in 2007. The
payments were discovered when it came to light that the union had disclosed
the contribution to the AEC a full fourteen months after the 2007 election.64
Despite discovering this violation more than ten years ago, the AEC has yet
to take any action regarding the offense, focusing instead on reorganizing its
corporate structure and attempting to rehabilitate its own reputation.
C.

The United Kingdom’s Electoral Commission

The United Kingdom’s EC was created in 1997, much later than its
counterparts in the United States and Australia. The EC was established by
the Political Parties, Elections, and Referendums Act (“PPERA”), which
also set limits on the amounts registered political parties could accept from
donors and the amounts those parties could spend leading up to those
elections. 65 Though originally tasked with overseeing and promoting
elections and campaigns in the UK, the Commission gained more power in
2006 when Parliament passed the Electoral Administration Act. This Act
required local authorities to review and report all polling stations to the
Commission. 66 In 2009, Parliament’s Political Parties and Elections Act
expanded those powers again, instituting a wider range of civil sanctions that
the Commission could impose on violators.67
The EC’s current jurisdiction includes overseeing elections and
regulating campaign finance throughout the UK. The agency is divided into
four main offices: Communications and Research, Electoral Administration
and Guidance, Finance and Corporate Services, and Political Finance and
Regulation.68
63

Id.
Brad Norington, Shorten donated AWU funds to his own campaign, AUSTRALIAN (Aug. 17, 2017),
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/industrial-relations/shorten-donated-awu-funds-to-hispolitical-campaign/news-story/5ebf5e2436581d96585c2c7f509c87b7.
65
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c. 41 at § 18 (Eng.).
66
Electoral Administration Act 2006, c. 22 (JDXN?).
67
Political Parties and Elections Act 2009, c. 12, § 1(3) (Eng.).
68
Who we are, ELECTORAL COMM’N, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/who-weare (last visited July 20, 2017).
64
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The Commission itself has nine or ten commissioners who are
independent of political parties.69 Commissioners may not be members or
officers of a registered party; hold relevant elected office; or have been
employed by a party, served in office, or been named as a donor to a party at
any point in the past five years.70 Up to four of the ten commissioners are
nominated by registered parties of Parliament.71 Each party may nominate
up to three commissioners, and no more than two ultimately appointed
commissioners may have been nominated by the same party. 72 The
Commission also includes an Executive Team and a Senior Leadership
group, who support the Commission “by providing day-to-day leadership to
implement [its] strategy successfully.” 73 These teams function largely in the
same way as staff members of the FEC and AEC.
The Commission’s statutory enforcement responsibilities come from
the PPERA, which requires the agency to “monitor and take all reasonable
steps to secure compliance with” campaign finance law.74 As the regulator
of campaign finance, the EC “make[s] sure people understand the rules and
tr[ies] to prevent people breaking the rules, [is] able to investigate and
impose sanctions when people do break the rules, [and] publish[es] data on
political funding and spending.” 75 The Commission also advises the
government on proposed changes to campaign finance rules.76
The EC learns about potential campaign finance violations either
through its own independent monitoring, complaints made by individuals,
press reports, or referrals from other regulators. 77 The Commission
“check[s] all potential breaches of the PPERA rules to determine if they
69

The
Commissioners,
ELECTORAL COMM’N, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/ourwork/who-we-are/the-commissioners (last visited July 20, 2017).
70
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c.41, § 3(4)(a)–(d) (Eng.).
71
Id. at § 3A(1).
72
Id. at § 3A(5). The Queen nominally makes all appointments, but generally with the advice of
Parliament. Id. at cf.(1)(4).
73
Executive
Team
and
Senior
Leadership
Group,
ELECTORAL
COMM’N, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/who-we-are/executive-and-management-team
(last visited July 20, 2017).
74
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c. 41, § 145 (Eng.).
75
Our
role
as
regulator
of
political
party
finances,
ELECTORAL
COMM’N, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/roles-and-responsibilities/our-role-asregulator-of-political-party-finances (last visited July 20, 2017).
76
Id.
77
ELECTORAL
COMM’N,
ENFORCEMENT
POLICY
12
(2016),
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/199703/April-2016-EnforcementPolicy.pdf [hereinafter EC ENFORCEMENT POLICY].
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should be assessed.” 78 If the Commission finds reasonable grounds to
suspect an offense, it may open an investigation.79 However, before actually
opening an investigation, the EC weighs “whether or not a matter is in the
public interest and justifies the use of [its] resources,”80 considering factors
like the seriousness of the offense, the strength of the evidence, the duration
of the suspected offense, the compliance history of the person who may have
committed the offense, and any steps already taken to rectify the breach.81
Investigations have three possible outcomes: a determination that
there is not enough evidence of an offense to take action, the Commission’s
satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that an offense has been committed,
or the Commission’s decision that it is no longer in the public interest to
investigate a suspected offense. 82 When the EC is satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that an offense occurred, it decides whether to impose a
sanction and refers the matter to the police, if appropriate.83
Generally, the EC imposes sanctions where it considers it appropriate,
proportionate, and in the public interest.84 When determining the size of a
sanction, the Commission weighs a number of factors: the seriousness of the
offense, the harm caused, any financial gain or advantage the beneficiary
may have received, whether the offense was inadvertent or deliberate,
offenders’ cooperation with the investigation, whether the matter was
reported voluntarily, efforts to mitigate the offense’s impact, and efforts
taken to reduce the likelihood of recurrence. 85 Offenders are given the
opportunity to respond to sanctions, and their appeals are heard by a member
of the Commission.86
In contrast with the United States and Australia, the United Kingdom’s
campaign finance laws focus on limiting the expenditures made by
candidates rather than limiting the donations that parties and individuals can
receive.87 There are no limits on the amounts political parties or electoral
78
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candidates may receive;88 however, parties are obligated to report donations
of over £5000 to the EC each year, and individual candidates must submit a
return detailing donations of £50 or more.89 Donations of over £50 must
come from permissible donors—that is, individuals registered on a UK
electoral register, UK-registered political parties, or UK-registered
companies, trade unions, building societies, or unincorporated associations.
Foreign donors are not considered to be permissible donors.90 The EC is
empowered to “seek forfeiture orders in the courts to recover from political
parties the value of donations” it believes to be impermissible.91 Spending
limits on electoral expenses are set through secondary legislation by the
UK’s secretary of state, and only change upon recommendation from the EC
or when the secretary of state deems it appropriate.92
The EC is also empowered to impose civil penalties. For offenses
with fixed penalties, the Commission imposes a fine of £200.93 Failure to
pay the fine within two weeks of the deadline triggers criminal penalties.94
For offenses with discretionary penalties, the Commission calculates the
amount of the fine according to the nature of the offense, taking into account
the same factors considered when choosing whether to sanction a party in
the first place.95 Penalties may be between £250 and £20000 for individual
offenses.96
The Commission also has the power to impose compliance notices
and restoration notices, comparable to injunctive relief and restitution in the
United States. 97 The EC can impose compliance and restoration notices
alone or in combination with discretionary penalties and aims to “restore the
position [of the campaign], as far as possible, to what it would have been
had no breach occurred.”98
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Finally, the Commission may impose a forfeiture of funds.99 When a
donation is not permissible, the EC can seek the forfeiture of some or all of
the donation, at which point the donated money is given to the public purse.
Though the Commission has the power to seek a forfeiture order through
court proceedings, it usually achieves forfeiture through an agreement with
the person or organization who accepted the donation.100
The EC does not impose criminal penalties, and the Commission
generally does not conduct investigations for offenses where only criminal
prosecution is available. These offenses include knowing violations of
donor restrictions,101 false statements or declarations to the Commission,102
and obstruction of investigations.103 Instead, the EC may refer the matter to
police or prosecuting authorities for investigation. 104 When it becomes
aware of a potential criminal offense relating to campaign finance or an
offense “which [the Commission] consider[s] to be so serious that . . . civil
sanctions may not be an adequate measure, [the Commission] will liaise and
share information with the relevant authority so that it can consider
investigating or prosecuting.”105
Although the EC tends to be more aggressive in investigations than its
counterparts in the United States and Australia, it fails to impose meaningful
penalties upon campaign finance violators—even those in power. In 2015,
the Tory Party consistently exceeded spending limits in campaigns for
candidates in twenty-nine constituencies, quite possibly tipping the scales in
the election, 106 leading to a thirty-eight page EC report on the party’s
campaign finance violations. However, the Tory Party ignored the EC’s
investigation almost entirely. The party took no action to respond, correct
inaccurate reporting, or make any attempt at restitution.107 Party members
99
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simply argued that the Commission seemed to have found only
administrative errors in the Torys’ campaign finance activity, 108 forcing the
EC to file papers with the High Court demanding information for the
investigation. Ultimately, the misspent amount—£250,000—amounted to
less than one percent of what the party spent in total during the election.
The EC issued its highest-ever fine as a penalty—just £70000—two years
after the election had ended.109
III.

THE NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD

The New York City Campaign Finance Board (“CFB”), in contrast to
its national counterparts in the United States, Australia, and the United
Kingdom, generally is known as an effective enforcement body.110 As this
Comment discusses in Part IV, five factors make the CFB particularly
effective: independent authority, professional staffing, impasse prevention,
relative political freedom, and the power to impose serious civil and criminal
penalties. An examination of the CFB’s history and structure illustrates that
effectiveness.
Founded in 1988 after several local corruption scandals,111 the Board
was established as part of a sweeping series of ethics reforms, including the
Campaign Finance Act 112 and Question Six, 113 a public referendum that
108
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established the Board and passed with 79.8% of the city’s support.114 The
referendum took a strong regulatory stance; it aimed to encourage
participation by candidates and small contributors, reduce campaign
spending, limit the size of contributions, and ultimately open city elections
to a broader range of candidates.115 Even at its inception, the Board was
“assigned broad powers to carry out the purposes of [campaign finance law],
including publicizing the names of candidates violating its provisions” and
establishing a database of contribution and expenditure information for
public access.116 The Board was also tasked with creating and distributing
New York City’s Voters’ Guide.117
Structurally, the CFB is difficult for any one party to control and
impossible to deadlock. Tasked with “overseeing the work of the agency,
mak[ing] public funds and penalty determinations, issu[ing] advisory
opinions and adopt[ing] rules,” the Board itself is nonpartisan, consisting of
five appointed members who each serve five-year terms.118 The odd number
of members prevents deadlocked votes.
Member appointments are
staggered, with two members each appointed by the Speaker of the City
Council and the mayor, neither of whom may be enrolled in the same
political party.119 The fifth member is selected by the mayor in consultation
with the Speaker.120
Admittedly, this presents a double-edged sword; the mayor and
Speaker are empowered to stack the CFB with ideologically similar
members, provided they are not of the same party. Though the Working
Families Party is an independent political party, it shares many policies and
positions with the Democratic Party, ultimately allowing for two similarlyminded council members to create a voting bloc despite their nominally
different party affiliations.121 The mayor and the Speaker could load the
CFB with liberal (or conservative) votes with very little oversight, allowing
113
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them to push a regime of increased or decreased enforcement depending on
their current political agenda.
Members of the Board must be city residents and registered voters,
and they must not be officers of political parties, candidates for any city
office, participants in any capacity in any campaign for city office, officers
or employees of the city, or registered lobbyists.122 Board members do not
work for the CFB full-time and are compensated $100 per working day.123
However, the Board is statutorily entitled to employ necessary staff
members124 who analyze, audit, and publicize how money is raised and spent
in local elections; educate voters; and make policy and legislative
recommendations to the Board.125 As of July 2017, the staff consisted of
seventeen full-time employees. 126 Though the CFB’s specific operating
budget is not statutorily protected from a budget shutdown, the law does
protect the funding the Board dispenses and the operation and distribution of
that funding, ensuring a city government shutdown will not cripple the
agency’s function.127
The Board’s independent authority is substantial; it has the power to
investigate matters related to campaign finance law, to require the
attendance and testimony of any person relevant to investigation, and to
compel the production of relevant documents and other evidence. 128 The
Board is also empowered to audit and examine all matters related to
campaign finance.129
Penalties issued by the CFB are significant and public. Candidates
whose expenditures exceed statutory limitations incur a fine of three times
the excess.130 Failure to respond to the Board’s audit reports incurs a fine of
ten percent of the candidate’s public funds. 131 A candidate’s knowing
misrepresentation of information to the Board incurs forfeiture of all public
122
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funds and criminal penalties.132 Further, the Board is statutorily authorized
to publicize campaign finance law violations.133
The enforcement process in New York City begins in one of two
ways: either the Board receives a written complaint alleging a campaign
finance violation or the Board undertakes an investigation on its own
initiative.134 The Board may investigate possible violations at any point. An
investigation may include a field investigation, issuing subpoenas, taking
sworn testimony, issuing interrogatories, and more. No specific evidentiary
standard is required for the Board to instigate an investigation.135
When the Board believes a violation has occurred, it notifies the
candidate and treasurer of her campaign of the alleged violation and
proposes a civil penalty or repayment obligation. 136 This is the only
opportunity a candidate has to submit information and documentation to
contest the violation. 137 The Board then considers any submitted
information to determine the amount of civil penalties.138 The Board may
also institute conciliation or mediation proceedings for novel issues of law,
if appropriate.139
The CFB has been effective and aggressive in enforcement from its
inception. After then-Mayor Ed Koch signed its authorizing legislation into
law, the CFB did not hesitate to penalize Koch’s own campaign for
violations after its first round of investigations and audits.140 Even current
Mayor Bill de Blasio, who has appointed current Board members, is not
immune to the CFB’s aggressive enforcement. In 2016, he was fined almost
$48000 for improper spending during his 2013 campaign.141 The Board’s
use of technology is also commendable—all candidates are listed in a
publicly-accessible enforcement database according to their borough or
132
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district with notifications of whether their disclosure statements are late or
missing.142
IV.

FIVE FACTORS FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT, APPLIED

As revealed in the discussion above, five factors have made the New
York City Campaign Finance Board notably successful. Specifically, the
CFB’s strength comes from its independent authority, professional staffing,
tiebreaking procedures and impasse prevention, relative political freedom,
and power to impose serious civil and criminal penalties. 143 The same
factors that make the New York City CFB so effective, applied on a national
level, could increase the efficacy of the FEC, AEC, and EC.144
A.

Independent Authority

The CFB’s independent authority is significant, particularly for a
municipal enforcement body. It has the power to “oversee . . . the work of
the agency, make public funds and penalty determinations, issue advisory
opinions and adopt rules,”145 and it is empowered to investigate campaign
finance law matters. 146 In addition, the CFB can compel attendance and
testimony of any person relevant to an investigation, as well as the
production of relevant documents and evidence.147 Finally, the Board has
the power (and staffing resources) to audit any candidate in a local
election,148 independently impose penalties for violations,149 and to publicize
those violations.150
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The United States’ FEC currently lacks the power to conduct random
audits; rather, it only automatically audits publicly-funded presidential
candidates.151 Audits of non-presidential campaigns are only permitted for
cause,152 though reformers argue random audits would serve as a deterrent
for would-be violators. 153 Reformers also argue that allowing courts to
review citizen complaints that have been ignored for more than 120 days de
novo would de-politicize enforcement, granting courts more independent
authority to apply the law when the FEC fails to act.154 Finally, allowing the
FEC to petition the Supreme Court for writs of certiorari to appeal civil
enforcement actions would give the Commission more independent power to
enforce civil penalties without the involvement of the Department of
Justice.155
Though billed as an independent agency, the AEC’s power to
independently enforce the law is quite limited. While the electoral
commissioner has the power to bring a court case against parties or
candidates who fail to disclose donations properly,156 the Commission has
minimal power to pursue criminal charges. Instead, the Commission refers
cases to state law enforcement when it believes a knowing or willful
violation has taken place and leaves it within the state’s discretion to pursue
the matter further.157 In other words, the AEC’s independent power rests
more in redistricting and in the administration of elections than in
enforcement of campaign finance laws.158 As in the United States, allowing
the Commission the power to impose criminal penalties independently,
establish more severe fines, and appeal to the country’s High Court would
dramatically increase its ability to enforce campaign finance laws.
In contrast, the EC’s independent authority surpasses that of the FEC
and AEC. The Commission’s powers include the ability to issue disclosure
notices, which require disclosure of specific documents or information
151
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related to an organization’s expenditures; to obtain an inspection warrant
when parties unreasonably refuse to disclose documents; to issue
investigation notices, which require production of documents and
information related to an investigation; to obtain a disclosure order, a courtmandated order to produce the same information; and to require an
individual to obtain a statutory interview.159 The Commission also has the
power to issue stop notices (similar to injunctions in the United States) to
organizations engaging in activity it reasonably believes to be damaging to
public confidence in elections. 160 As demonstrated by the Tory election
scandal, however, without the independent ability to establish more
meaningful penalties, the EC’s independent authority lacks teeth.
B.

Professional Staffing

One of the aspects that makes the New York City CFB effective is its
professional staff. Though CFB board membership is not a full-time job, the
agency itself is driven by staff that serves full-time, giving the Board the
capacity to audit every candidate.161
In contrast (and appointment issues notwithstanding), the FEC’s
functionality has been limited in the past by basic funding issues during
government shutdowns. In 2013, then-Commission Chairwoman Ellen
Weintraub was one of only four FEC employees (out of 339) deemed
essential during a shutdown. All four were commissioners.162 “I’d literally
be the one turning the lights on,” she said in interviews during the budget
impasse. 163 Phone calls, emails, audits, and enforcement cases went
unattended during the shutdown.164 The staffing shortfall came both during
oral arguments for McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission 165 and
while the Commission itself was shorthanded: Democrat Ann Ravel and
Republican Lee Goodman, though confirmed by the Senate, had yet to start
their terms.166
159
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Even when the federal government is not shut down, the FEC remains
underfunded. Though the Commission’s budget has increased over the past
decade—funding went from $54.2 million in 2006 to $65.8 million in 2016,
an increase of almost 18 percent 167 —that growth is far outpaced by the
explosion of political spending over the same period. The federal election
cycle cost $2.85 billion in 2005–2006; in 2011–2012 it jumped to $6.3
billion, a 120 percent increase.168 Over the same period, the FEC went from
385 staffers—372 permanent and 13 temporary—to 338 in 2013. 169
Individual analysts went from monitoring 200–300 political committees in
previous years to more than 500 each in 2013.170
The AEC has specified that professionalization of its workforce is one
of its long-term goals. The agency’s corporate plan for 2016–2020 includes
initiatives to professionalize its workforce.171 The agency aims to roll out a
core skills and capability training program for all AEC staff, improve the
capability of executive-level agency heads, and better inform all staff of
their job expectations.172 The AEC plans to improve recruitment, retention,
and training of employees. 173 It also aims to improve its information
technology systems via replacement of old and outdated equipment, increase
desktop and mobile access for staff members, and technology training across
the agency.174 Those efforts ultimately aim to correct the lack of attention
paid to violations like the ones in Tasmania, where lobbyists failed to
disclose large donations and were never penalized.175
Tasked with a wider jurisdiction than its counterparts, the EC in the
United Kingdom is a much larger enterprise than the enforcement bodies of
the United States and Australia. Accordingly, and to its credit, its workforce
is largely professionalized and the Commission avoids some of the
understaffing issues that face the FEC and AEC. With full-time offices in
London, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, as well as regional teams
throughout England, the EC works to make itself available across the UK in
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person, via telephone, or via email. 176 Salaries and business travel for
Commission members are also closely tallied and reported,177 and over 130
full-time staffers worked for the agency in 2016.178
C.

Methods of Preventing Impasse

New York City’s CFB has avoided impasse chiefly by eschewing
even-numbered boards.
Stalemates are rare, partially due to the
incorporation of minor political parties with similar ideologies. New York’s
mayor and Speaker of the City Council each appoint two members to the
five-person board, neither of whom may be of the same political party.179 In
his first selection, Mayor Bill de Blasio sidestepped the limitations on party
members by appointing Naomi Zauderer of the Working Families Party,180 a
minor political party closely aligned with progressive politics.181 The move
freed him to select a Democratic-leaning commissioner for his second
appointment. Because the fifth seat is filled by the mayor in consultation
with the Speaker, it is likely Mayor de Blasio will be able to build a strong
progressive majority on the CFB.182
In contrast, deadlocked votes have crippled the FEC; in fact, some
allege that Congress designed the FEC to fail, most notably through a
bipartisan, six-member structure that requires agreement from at least four
commissioners for substantive action. 183 In a report issued when she
announced her early departure from the Commission, former Commissioner
Ann Ravel pointed out that the four-vote threshold had allowed the agency’s
176

Our Offices, ELECTORAL COMM’N, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/contact-us/ouroffices (last visited Sept. 30, 2017).
177
ELECTORAL
COMM’N,
ANNUAL
REPORT
AND
ACCOUNTS
2016–17
60,
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/232864/2016-17-Annual-report-andAccounts-English.pdf.
178
Id. at 67. Adjusted for population, this is proportionally nearly twice the number of employees the
FEC employed in 2013, the last year for which staffing numbers are readily available.
179
Board Members, supra note 118.
180
Editorial, Will Mayor de Blasio leash the city’s campaign-finance watchdog?, N.Y. POST (Oct. 28,
2016), http://nypost.com/2016/10/28/will-mayor-de-blasio-leash-the-citys-campaign-finance-watchdog/.
181
New York Working Families, WORKING FAMILIES, http://workingfamilies.org/states/new-york/
(last visited Jul. 19, 2017). Though the Working Families Party has endorsed both Democratic and
Republican candidates, the party most closely identifies with the labor movement and progressive politics.
182
Assuming political diversity is normatively positive, the relatively homogenous makeup of New
York City’s CFB may be considered problematic; however, it has led to the expansion of regulation and
enforcement, which this comment assumes to be a positive net result in New York. I address the problems
with national political homogeneity in Part V of this comment.
183
R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RES. SERV., THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION: OVERVIEW AND
SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS R44318 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44318.pdf.

600

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 27 NO. 2

Republican bloc to “delay and dismiss flagrant violations, impose
significantly lower penalties, and leave major cases without resolution.”184
She noted that, in 2006, commissioners deadlocked in less than three percent
of substantive votes in MURs closed that year. In 2016, that number jumped
to thirty percent. Incorporating minor political parties could help to break
the current deadlock at the FEC. Appointments to the Board are made by the
president with the advice and consent of the Senate. 185 By selecting
commissioners who identify with minor parties, a president could
theoretically stack the FEC with commissioners sympathetic to his or her
views on regulation of campaign finance, either increasing enforcement
dramatically or ceasing it altogether.
Unlike their American counterpart, the AEC and EC are structured to
avoid impasse. Rather than appointing equal voting power among an even
number of commissioners, each Commission empowers its members
differently, avoiding the FEC’s problems with deadlocks. In Australia, the
chairperson, electoral commissioner, and non-judicial member each play
different roles in enforcing, reporting, and educating the public on campaign
finance enforcement.186 Accordingly, preventing impasse is not a concern; a
deadlock cannot occur because decisions are made by individual
commissioners who manage specific portfolios of responsibilities rather than
via consensus.
In the United Kingdom, the EC is structured more like a corporate
scheme than a voting panel; nine to ten commissioners set a working
strategy and priorities for the EC as an organization, each representing
specific regions of the UK or political demographics in Parliament.187 The
Executive Team and staff of the Commission, who are not subject to
appointments by Parliament, handle day-to-day functions of election
administration. 188 Because a vote by the Commission is not required to
update a regulation, trigger an investigation, or impose a sanction, impasse is
not an issue.
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Political Independence

The CFB is considered a nonpartisan, formidable enforcement body
that has “angered all four incumbent mayors in office since 1988.” 189
Though appointed by the mayor and the Speaker of the City Council, Board
members are from different political parties. The appointment process
encourages the inclusion of members from minor political parties, allowing
for more ideological nuance on the Board than its federal counterpart’s
traditional partisan voting blocs. Eschewing partisan appointments also
ensures Board seats will not remain empty due to partisan delays, as they did
in 2008 at the FEC.190
In the United States, the FEC’s bipartisan structure presents unique
challenges when it comes to political independence.
Though the
Commission’s structure is designed to protect against overly partisan
influence, Congress’s choice to establish an ostensibly balanced and evennumbered Commission has been both praised for insulating the agency from
political influence and criticized for thwarting its effectiveness.191 From the
beginning, the Commission’s bipartisan structure has made it difficult for the
FEC to compromise on the most contentious issues and has opened
individual commissioners to charges of partisan bias.192
In Australia, the three commissioners of the AEC are appointed by the
governor-general,193 who is himself appointed by the prime minister via the
Queen. 194 The governor-general then essentially serves as the chief
executive in the Australian federal government,195 without a prescribed term
of office. Appointments to the AEC are made with the advice of the
legislature in much the same way that the members of the FEC are appointed
in the United States.196 However, due to the varying duties and levels of
power among the commissioners, as well as the distribution of responsibility
among the various levels of the AEC’s administrative structure, the
Commission is more like a large company tasked with administering
189
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elections than an agency subject to political influence. Though it lacks
insulation from politics, it also does not seem to suffer from paralysis due to
political influence.
The EC, in contrast to the FEC and AEC, goes to great lengths to
insulate its individual commissioners from political influence. Candidates
for the Commission may not be members, officers, or employees of a
registered political party; hold relevant elected office; or be named donors
within the five years preceding their appointment.197 However, the PPERA
provides that the registered leader of a qualifying party may propose for
consideration up to four of the commissioners, 198 and each of the three
largest parties may nominate three commissioners for appointment. 199 In
total, no one party may have proposed more than two of the ten
commissioners ultimately appointed, ensuring that no more than twenty
percent of the Commission represents (and is potentially beholden to) a
single political party.200
E.

Enforcement of Civil and Criminal Penalties

The CFB is empowered to impose meaningful penalties on campaign
finance law violators. Statutorily, it has audit and subpoena power, both
before and after an election, and can withhold public funds from candidates
it believes to be noncompliant.201 It can make civil penalty assessments and
go to court to enforce them, and often imposes penalties of up to $10000 per
violation. 202 However, most conflicts are resolved via conciliation, a
mediation-style dispute resolution process.203
The FEC’s assessment of fines has declined dramatically over the past
decade. “In 2006, the Commission assessed more than $5.5 million in MUR
civil penalties. In 2016, MUR civil penalties imposed totaled only
$595,425.”204 Most likely, the deadlocked board and decrease in staffing
and bandwidth (rather than a decline in violations) contributed to that
reduction. In addition, the FEC has the power to refer knowing and willful
197
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200
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violations to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. 205
However, most cases do not involve personal candidate liability, resulting in
limited criminal prosecution of campaign finance law violations.206
The AEC has proposed updates to its own regulations that would
make enforcement easier and penalties more automatic, but the Australian
legislature’s lack of political will when it comes to campaign finance
regulation has limited its progress. Suggestions included the issuance of
“on-the-spot” penalties and fines for occurrences of late or incomplete
disclosure forms,207 designed to encourage contemporaneous or continuous
disclosure. 208 More extreme ideas included empowering the AEC to
deregister political parties and liquidate party assets as a penalty for
misleading the Commission,209 an increase in pecuniary penalties,210 or the
addition of imprisonment as a penalty for repeated or serious offenses.211 As
of October 2017, none of the Commission’s suggestions had been
implemented.
In December 2016, the UK’s EC also called for stronger powers to
sanction political parties found to be in violation of campaign finance
laws. 212 The maximum penalty the EC is empowered to impose is just
£20000. Injunctive penalties are also available, and the Commission can
refer cases to the Metropolitan Police Service for knowing violations. 213
However, even facing multiple violations by the Tory Party during the 2015
campaign, the EC was only empowered to impose a total of £70000 in
penalties—less than a quarter of one percent of the party’s overall spending
that election.214
205
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LIMITS AND CHALLENGES OF APPLYING A SPECIFIC MUNICIPALITY’S
STRATEGY ON A NATIONAL LEVEL

Translating strategies that make sense on a municipal level, however,
does not come without its challenges. The differences in ideological
diversity and political will between a city and a country make for anything
but a seamless transition. New York City’s geographical compactness,
political homogeneity, 215 and pro-regulation leadership make it the ideal
home for a campaign finance enforcement commission like the CFB to
flourish. Application on a national scale would likely face the opposite
circumstances: expansive geography (and with it, political diversity) and
possible resistance to additional regulation of political spending.
The adoption of a pro-regulation campaign finance regime in New
York City may have been due to the convergence of three factors: an
impetus, political will, and the support of voters. The CFB only came into
being after a series of scandals led the public to demand investigations into,
and laws to prevent, corruption on the municipal level.216 The political will
to maintain the CFB’s enforcement power was strong, even after Mayor Ed
Koch, who had signed the Campaign Finance Reform Act into law, became
one of the first candidates penalized for violating contribution limits after
overspending in his 1989 primary campaign.217 An overwhelming majority
of voters passed a referendum creating the CFB in 1988. 218 The City
Council remains pro-regulation when it comes to campaign finance, and has
added new legislation and regulation that further reins in contributions and
increases disclosure responsibilities over a half dozen times since 1996.219
The United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, in contrast,
lack the three things that may have made New York City’s campaign finance
regime so effective. Though each of the three nations has faced countless
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continuously-unfolding campaign finance scandals in recent years 220 (and
indeed, the implementation of campaign finance regulation was triggered by
election scandals, particularly in the United States),221 none has used those
scandals as a catalyst for reform and increased regulation. They also lack
the political will to increase regulation on the national level,222 regardless of
voter support of campaign finance regulation.223 While it may be easy for a
bill strengthening campaign finance restrictions to survive a city council
vote for regulation in New York City, where 48 of 51 councilmembers and
the mayor are Democrats, legislation that strengthens financial restrictions is
far more difficult to pass on the national level, particularly in more
conservative legislative bodies.
However, transitioning successful local strategies and laws into model
legislation for use on a national level is not entirely unheard of outside the
campaign finance realm. In 1994, sex offender registries in the United
States were intended only for use by law enforcement. 224 After Megan
Kanka, a seven-year-old girl in New Jersey, was raped and murdered by a
sex offender living in her neighborhood, her parents pushed for local laws
requiring public sex offender registration for high-risk offenders.225 After
New Jersey Congressman Dick Zimmer, a Republican, sponsored a bill
based on the state legislation, United States President Bill Clinton, a
220
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Democrat, ultimately signed “Megan’s Law,” a federal crime measure
allowing states to inform communities when convicted sex offenders move
into the area.226
The successful passage of Megan’s Law demonstrates the three
factors that may be needed for the passage of state or municipal-level reform
to be successful on a national level: a catalyzing event, bipartisan political
will, and public support.227 Admittedly, strengthening campaign finance law
enforcement faces an uphill battle when it comes to the latter two factors; it
is difficult to imagine a legislative body finding the political will to change a
campaign finance regime that elected them, and campaign finance reform no
doubt inspires a tiny fraction of the passion the public feels for violence
against children. More exhaustive research may indicate easier paths to
reform. However, without a catalyzing event, bipartisan political support,
and public interest, the implementation of stronger campaign finance
enforcement powers is unlikely to become a priority in the United States,
Australia, or the United Kingdom.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The inefficacy of the Federal Election Commission, Australian
Electoral Commission, and the United Kingdom’s Electoral Commission did
not come about by chance; rather, it is inherently encoded in each agency’s
authorizing legislation and enforced by their appointment processes,
enforcement powers, and exposure to political gridlock. While the FEC is
deadlocked by constant impasse, the AEC fails to monitor or penalize
violations of campaign finance law effectively, and the EC remains crippled
by insufficiently harsh penalties that fail to deter parties from overstepping
spending limits.
The New York City Campaign Finance Board, however, remains a
model of effective enforcement because it has significant independent
authority, employs professional staff, is structured in a way that precludes
deadlocked votes, is relatively free from political influence over
appointments and enforcement, and has the power to impose serious
226
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penalties when violations occur. Though applying those factors on a
national scale presents its own set of challenges, the FEC, AEC, and EC may
be made more effective if they implement portions of the CFB’s structure,
making for stronger enforcement of campaign finance laws in their
respective election systems.
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